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JURY INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING MULTIPLE
DEFENDANTS AND STRICT LIABILITY AFTER THE
PENNSYLVANIA COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE ACT
JAMES E. BEASLEY
G. TAYLOR TUNSTALL, JR. f
ANY QUESTIONS OF LAW will undoubtedly arise under
the briefly worded Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act.'
Resolution of these legal questions, many of which are not explicitly
addressed in the Act, must lie with the courts and ultimately the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Since cases in which the act is applica-
ble are only now beginning to come to trial, 2 the courts have not yet
provided answers.
I. THE IMMEDIATE TASK
An initial concern of the trial courts in the Commonwealth is the
avoidance of costly and time-consuming retrials. To this end and in
the interest of uniform application of the law, a standard jury instruc-
tion avoiding the debatable issues is needed immediately. To imple-
ment the instruction, a set of jury interrogatories which can be used
in any case without creating error is also essential. The interrogatories
should enable a jury to make every factual conclusion necessary to
apply the law. At the same time, the issues should be presented to
the jury as simply and clearly as possible, with a premium placed
upon elimination of sources of confusion and the possibility of incon-
sistent answers. The goal is to facilitate the entry of a judgment on
the basis of the jury's answers irrespective of the law that is ulti-
mately applied. In the absence of guidance from the appellate courts,
trial judges will be required to exercise their own best judgment as to
the resolution of the questions of law. 3 If the interrogatories are
LL.B., Temple University School of Law, 1956. Member, Pennsylvania Bar.
ft J.D., Villanova University School of Law, 1976. Member, Pennsylvania Bar.
1. For purposes of this symposium, references to and quotations from the Pennsylvania
Comparative Negligence Act have been made without citation. For the text of the Act, see
Spina, Introduction, Symposium: Comparative Negligence in Pennsylvania, 24 VILL. L. REv. 419,
419 (1979).
2. Shortly after enactment, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held the Act inapplicable to
causes of action accruing before the Act's effective date, September 7, 1976. Costa v. Lair, 241
Pa. Super Ct. 517, 363 A.2d 1313 (1976) (per curiam).
3. Other commentators, relying upon precedents from other jurisdictions, have suggested
answers to some of the questions which will undoubtedly arise. See, e.g., Hankin, A Plaintiff's
Lawyer Looks at the Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act, in THE PENNSYLVANIA COM-
PARATIVE NEGLIGENCE ACT (Pa. Bar Inst. 1977); Timby, Comparative Negligence, 48 PA.
(518)
1
Beasley and Tunstall: Jury Instructions Concerning Multiple Defendants and Strict Liabi
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1979
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE IN PENNSYLVANIA
properly drawn, however, an appellate court should be able to re-
mold any verdict in light of the answers to the interrogatories to re-
flect any different resolution of the legal questions.
The focus of this article is upon the drafting of jury instructions
and special interrogatories that will fulfill the goal of providing every
factual conclusion necessary in applying the Act while minimizing the
risk of the commission of reversible error. This will be explored par-
ticularly in regard to two frequently arising contexts: cases involving
multiple defendants and products liability cases. Before one can co-
gently consider any recommended instruction, it is necessary to
examine the Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act. We, there-
fore, begin with an overview of the Act. This overview is followed by
the recommended general instruction, a general explanation of the
instruction, and a specific analysis addressed to its use where there
are multiple defendants, a strict liability cause of action, and finally
both multiple defendants and strict liability claims.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PENNSYLVANIA
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE ACT
It should be emphasized at the outset that the Pennsylvania Com-
parative Negligence Act does not change the definition of negligence,
contributory negligence, or legal causation. The Act merely mandates
in section (a) that a certain comparison be made in actions "for negli-
gence" between the negligence of the defendant or defendants and
the negligence of the plaintiff. The only change in the law made by
this section is in the amount of damages recoverable by a plaintiff in a
negligence action. Contributory negligence is no longer a complete
bar to any recovery, but prohibits recovery only when a plaintiff's
.negligence is "greater than the causal negligence of the defendant or
B.A.Q. 219 (1977). It is submitted that such precedents are only helpful in identifying the
competing policies involved with an issue. But see Hankin, supra, at 37.
Competing policy considerations have been accorded such varying weights in other jurisdic-
tions that a decision supporting almost any point of view can be found. The resolution of ally
conflict in policies, however, is solely a matter of Pennsylvania policy in cases governed by
Pennsylvania law. Adding to the difficulty of relying upon the experience of another jurisdiction
are the complications created by the language of other comparative negligence statutes. Al-
though the wording of the Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act as a whole is similar to
that of several other states, it is identical to none. 'See id. A slight change in the statutory
language can yield a substantial change in the meaning of an act, as the experience of other
jurisdictions with comparative negligence acts has proven. Moreover, the legislative history of
the Act does not show that the Pennsylvania General Assembly conducted an extensive review
of existing comparative negligence statutes. See 1 PA. LEC. J. 1703-07 (Senate 1976). One must
therefore rely primarily upon the plain meaning of the language of the Pennsylvania Act. The
Act should be considered first in addressing any issue and should be authoritative if it specifi-
cally addresses the issue. Only when it does not treat the issue should Pennsylvania decisional
law and its underlying policy become the basis of interpretation.
1978-1979]
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defendants against whom recovery is sought." In addition, recover-
able damages are reduced "in proportion to the amount of negligence
attributed to the plaintiff." The ostensible purpose of section (a) is to
ameliorate the harsh result of a finding that both plaintiff and defend-
ant were negligent as long as most of the fault is not the plain-
tiff's. 4  Section (a) also has the effect of officially approving the obvi-
ously compromised jury verdicts that have been judicially accepted in
the past.
Section (b), which provides that contribution be apportioned
among joint tortfeasors in regard to their relative fault, leaves the law
of contribution intact except with respect to the measurement of per-
centages of contribution of joint tortfeasors inter se in negligence
cases. Prior law entitled a defendant to equal contribution from other
joint tortfeasors for a judgment executed against him,' but the Uni-
form Contribution Among Tort-feasors Act 6 is otherwise unaffected
by section (b). In an action under the Act, a defendant who is "com-
pelled to pay more than his percentage share may seek contribution"
such that his ultimate loss is "in the ratio of the amount of his causal
negligence to the amount of causal negligence attributed to all
defendants against whom recovery is allowed." This serves an equita-
ble purpose similar to that required by section (a) 7 since a slightly
negligent defendant is no longer automatically assessed with a fixed
percentage of responsibility for money damages, but rather is ulti-
mately liable according to his relative fault. In addition to its major
purpose of altering the law of contribution among joint tortfeasors
inter se, section (b) functions to save the judiciary and the defendants
the time and expense of an additional trial or hearing to apportion the
damages among the tortfeasors by facilitating the establishment of
their relative shares in the trial of the plaintiff's negligence cause of
action.
III. A PROPOSED BASIC JURY INSTRUCTION
The following instruction 8 is offered as appropriate for use in
cases to which the Comparative Negligence Act applies:
4. See 1 PA. LEG. J. 1704 (Senate 1976) (remarks of Sen. Duffield).
5. Wilner v. Croyle, 214 Pa. Super. Ct. 91, 252 A.2d 387 (1969); Parker ex rel. Bunting v.
Rodgers, 125 Pa. Super Ct. 48, 189 A. 693 (1937); Stewart v. Uniroyal, Inc., 72 Pa. D. & C.2d
206 (C.P. Allegheny County 1975), aff'd per curian, 238 Pa. Super. Ct. 726, 356 A.2d 821
(1976).
6. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8321-8327 (1978).
7. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
8. The instruction proposed here is largely based upon that recommended to date by the
Civil Instruction Subcommittee of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court Committee for Proposed
Standard Jury Instructions. See PENNSYLVANIA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTION 3.03A (Civil)
[VOL. 24: p. 518
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GENERAL COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
JURY INSTRUCTION
The Court has already instructed you about what you may
consider in determining whether the defendant(s) was (were) negli-
gent, whether the plaintiff was negligent, and whether such negli-
gence, if any, was a substantial contributing factor in bringing
about the plaintiff's harm. If you find, in accordance with these
instructions, that the defendant(s) was (were) negligent and such
negligence was a substantial contributing factor in bringing about
the plaintiff's harm, you must then consider whether the plaintiff
was negligent. If you find that the plaintiff was negligent and such
negligence was a substantial contributing factor in bringing about
his harm, then you must apply the Comparative Negligence Act,
which provides in section (a):
"[T]he fact that the plaintiff [decedent] may have been
guilty of. . . negligence shall not bar a recovery by the
plaintiff . . . [his legal representative] where such negli-
gence was not greater than the causal negligence of the
defendant or defendants against whom recovery is
sought, but any damages sustained by the plaintiff shall
be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence
attributed to the plaintiff [decedent]."
(Just as the law provides that a plaintiff's damages should be
diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable
to the plaintiff, so too it provides that an award should be divided
among the defendants in proportion to their relative degrees of
causal negligence. If you find that more than one defendant is li-
able to the plaintiff, you must also apply section (b) of the Com-
parative Negligence Act, which provides:
"Where recovery is allowed against more than one de-
fendant, each defendant shall be liable for that proportion
of the total dollar amount awarded as damages in the
ratio of the amount of his causal negligence to the
amount of causal negligence attributed to all defendants
against whom recovery is allowed.")
Under this Act, if you find that the defendant (any defendant
or more than one defendant) was causally negligent and you find
that the plaintiff (decedent) was also causally negligent, it is your
duty to apportion the relative degree of causal negligence between
the defendant (all of the defendants found negligent) and the plain-
tiff. In apportioning the causal negligence you should use your
common sense and experience to arrive at a result that is fair and
(Subcomm. Draft, November 13, 1977). Although the Subcommittee's work has been distri-
buted to the Pennsylvania judiciary it is still unofficial since the supreme court has yet to take
the necessary actions to adopt the standard.
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reasonable under the facts of this accident (occurrence) as you have
determined them from the evidence.
If you find that the plaintiff's causal negligence was greater
than the causal negligence of the defendant (the combined causal
negligence of those defendants you find to have been negligent),
then the plaintiff is barred from recovery and you need not con-
sider what damages should be awarded.
If you find that the plaintiff's causal negligence was equal to or
less than the causal negligence of the defendant (the combined
causal negligence of the defendants you find to have been causally
negligent), then you must set forth the percentages of causal negli-
gence attributable to the plaintiff and the percentage of causal neg-
ligence attributable to the defendant (each of the defendants you
find to have been causally negligent). The total of these percen-
tages must be 100 per cent. You will then determine the total
amount of damages to which the plaintiff would be entitled if he
had not been negligent; in other words, in finding the amount of
damages, you should not consider the degree, if any, of the plain-
tiff's fault. After you return your verdict, the court will reduce the
amount of damages you have found in proportion to the amount of
causal negligence which you have attributed to the plaintiff.
To clarify these instructions, the court will now distribute to
each of you a verdict form containing specific questions. At the
conclusion of your deliberations, one copy of this form should be
signed by your foreperson and handed to the court clerk; this will
constitute your verdict. The verdict form reads as follows:
Question 1:
Was the defendant (any of the defendants) negligent?
Defendant A Yes - No
Defendant B Yes_ No
Defendant C Yes_ No
If your answer to Question 1 is "no" ("no" as to all defendants) this
completes your deliberations and your foreperson should sign these
special findings and the jury shall return to the court room. Do not
answer any remaining questions.
Question 2:
Was the defendant's negligence (the negligence of any of those de-
fendants you have found to be negligent) a (substantial contributing
factor as defined in the charge) (legal cause) (proximate cause) in
bringing about the harm suffered by the plaintiff?
(VOL. 24: p. 518
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Defendant A Yes_ No
Defendant B Yes_ No
Defendant C Yes_ No
If your answer to Question 2 is "no" ("no" as to all defendants you
have found to be negligent) this completes your deliberations and
your foreperson should sign these special findings and the jury
shall return to the court room. Do not answer any remaining ques-
tions. If your answer to Questions 1 and 2 is "yes" ("yes" as to any
defendant) proceed to answer Question 3.
Question 3:
Was the plaintiff negligent?
Yes No_
If your answer is "no" proceed directly to question 5 below. Do
not answer Question 4.
Question 4:
Only if your answer to Question 3 above is "yes," answer this
question: was the plaintiff's negligence a (substantial contributing
factor as defined in the charge) (legal cause) (proximate cause) in
bringing about his harm?
Yes No_
Question 5:
Taking the combined negligence that was a (substantial contribut-
ing factor as defined in the charge) (legal cause) (proximate cause)
in bringing about the harm suffered by the plaintiff as 100 per
cent, what percentage of that causal negligence was attributable to
the defendant (each of the defendants you have found causally neg-
ligent) and what percentage was attributable to the plaintiff?
Percentage of causal negligence attributable
to Defendant A (Answer only if you have answered
"Yes" to Questions 1 and 2 for Defendant A).
Percentage of causal negligence attributable
to Defendant B (Answer only if you have answered
"Yes" to Questions 1 and 2 for Defendant B).
1978-1979]
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Percentage of causal negligence attributable
to Defendant C (Answer only if you have answered
"Yes" to Questions 1 and 2 for Defendant C).
Percentage of causal negligence attributable
to the plaintiff (Answer only if you have answered
"Yes" to Questions 3 and 4).
Total 100%
If you find the plaintiff's causal negligence to be greater than 50%,
this completes your deliberations and your foreperson should sign
these special findings and the jury shall return to the court room,
omitting Question 6. If you find the plaintiff's causal negligence to
be 50% or less, proceed to answer Question 6.
Question 6:
State the amount of damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiff as a
result of the accident (occurrence), without regard to and without
reduction by the percentage of causal negligence, if any, that you
have attributed to the plaintiff.
After your return your answers to these questions on the ver-
dict form, signed by your foreperson, the Court will determine the
amount to be awarded to the plaintiff by reducing the amount of
damages found by you in proportion to the percentage of the plain-
tiff's causal negligence, if any. I again caution you that you are not
to make this reduction yourselves in reaching the amount of the
plaintiff's damages, as set forth by you in answer to Question 6.
IV. A GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE PROPOSED INSTRUCTION
The instruction and special verdict form address liability and
damages issues in terms of negligence, since the Act purports to
apply only to "all actions brought to recover damages for negligence
resulting in death or injury to person or property." The instruction is
not appropriate for causes of action based upon intentional or willful
[VOL. 24: p. 518
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torts9 or upon products or strict tort liability.10 Moreover, section
(a) of the Act is not applicable where the trial judge rules as a matter
of law that the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent. Nonetheless,
if such a case goes to the jury against more than one defendant, the
instruction may be used to effectuate the apportionment among joint
tortfeasors by removing the questions and parts of questions relating
to plaintiff negligence.
Section (b) of the Act does not explicitly compel that the appor-
tionment among the defendants be made during the trial of the plain-
tiff's action,'1 yet no logical reason appears why the apportionment
should not be made at the same time that liability and damages are
determined. A jury must of necessity hear the same evidence of a
defendant's causal negligence in assessing the proportionate shares of
several defendants as it does in making the determinations required
by section (a) as to whether those defendants were causally negligent.
Any inconvenience suffered by the plaintiff, who ordinarily can have
no interest in the section (b) apportionment, 12 or by a defendant
whom the jury does not find causally negligent, in terms of the slight
amount of extra time needed to apportion the causal negligence of
defendants, is more than offset by the savings realized by the court
and the other defendants in avoiding a second and basically duplica-
tive proceeding.
A possible alternative to choosing between one full-scale trial and
two slightly smaller trials is the bifurcation of jury deliberations dur-
ing the course of one full-scale trial. Under this procedure, if more
than one defendant were found liable in section (a) deliberation, the
jury could then proceed to a section (b) deliberation after brief addi-
tional argument and instruction during which the attendance and par-
ticipation of the plaintiff and any defendants found not causally negli-
gent would not be required. This alternative would minimize any
possible confusion generated by the juxtaposition of section (a)'s com-
parison of plaintiff negligence with defendant negligence, and section
(b)'s apportionment of defendant negligence among the defendants
inter se. Any confusion could also be minimized by careful jury in-
9. Under the common law of Pennsylvania, contributory negligence is not a defense to an
intentional or willful tort. Kasanovich v. George, 348 Pa. 199, 34 A.2d 523 (1943).
10. Contributory negligence is not a defense to strict liability. McCown v. International
Harvester Co., 463 Pa. 13, 342 A.2d 381 (1975). For a detailed discussion of the Act's applicabil-
ity to strict liability cases, see notes 33-108 and accompanying text infra.
11. Section (b) is, of course, inapplicable to any case involving a single plaintiff and a single
defendant.
12. A plaintiff who is also a defendant can have an interest in the apportionment. The
liability under the act of a plaintiff in his role as defendant involves questions largely beyond the
scope of this article.
1978-1979]
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struction. When the jury is focusing on the segregation of plaintiff
negligence and defendant negligence in mathematical terms, it should
not take much additional effort to subdivide the defendant negli-
gence. Ultimately, the interest in judicial and adversarial economy
should dictate a general rule against bifurcation. Such considerations
have in fact led the Civil Instruction Subcommittee of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Committee for Proposed Standard Jury
Instructions to combine the two sections of the Act for the purpose of
drafting a model instruction.'
3
Similarly, the Act does not explicitly compel the use of special
interrogatories in cases in which the Act is applicable. The obvious
legislative intent to substitute an equitable procedure for the inconsis-
tent and sometimes harsh results encouraged by the doctrine of con-
tributory negligence can only be assured, however, if precise
guidelines for application of the Act to the facts are provided to the
jury. Furthermore, if the jury is asked to return only a general ver-
dict, a reviewing court will be faced with the unenviable, if not insol-
uble, tasks of determining the percentages of causal negligence as-
signed by the jury and deciding whether any error in the charge, if
one or more is made, had a prejudicial effect. It is therefore submit-
ted that special interrogatories are essential to fixing the percentages
of the parties' causal negligence in cases involving more than one
defendant. The thrust of section (b) simply cannot be given any effect
without them.14  Even where the jury is charged on the liability of
only one defendant, 15 a general verdict will usually not provide a
13. PENNSYLVANIA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTION, Subcomm. Note 3.03A (Civil) (Subcomm.
Draft, November 13, 1977). This note indicates: "[I]t was decided that the benefit of providing
one instruction with one set of interrogatories which could be used in any and every case was
the single most important factor. The instruction, therefore, combines the two sections of the
Act, and the interrogatories provide for every possible contingency." Id. at 25.1.
The comparison of plaintiff and defendant negligence and the apportionment of defendant
negligence among joint tortfeasors are in fact accomplished in the same numbered interrogatory
of the Subcommittee's special verdict form. PENNSYLVANIA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTION
3.03A, at 25.D (Civil) (Subcomm. Draft, November 13, 1977).
14. Section (b) preserves the plaintiff's right to execute full judgment against any defendant
against whom judgment is entered and also the defendant's right to contribution from joint
tortfeasors. If the contribution is to be based upon proportional fault, as required by § (b), the
proportions must be established in the verdict or in subsequent trials. It is submitted that a
rational legislature would not pass an Act mandating that a case be repeatedly tried until all of
the issues created by the Act were decided.
15. Unless the plaintiff's total damages were a relatively fixed figure, which is rare, a re-
viewing court would have to assume that the general verdict accurately reflected a reduction
based upon the plaintiff's share of causal negligence. To this extent, its decision can be no less
haphazard than the jury's decision. Furthermore, a reviewing court would still be without the
guidance provided by answers to special interrogatories in analyzing whether any error in the
charge was prejudicial. Additionally, the alternative of granting a new trial limited to certain
issues would be substantially eliminated.
[VOL. 24: p. 518
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reviewing court with the factual conclusions it needs in order to avoid
ineffective review.
It should also be noted that the phrases "contributory negli-
gence" and "comparative ngeligence" are not used in the instruction
or interrogatories. Although the Act does refer at one point to plain-
tiff negligence as "contributory negligence," the phrase is used in the
sense of a past term of art, the effect of which is being modified by
the Act. The existence of negligence and contributory negligence
have always been measured by the same standard of how an ordinar-
ily prudent man would act under the same or similar cir-
cumstances. 16 The plaintiff's negligence has been referred to as
"contributory negligence" in order to connote the legal effect ac-
corded its existence. Since plaintiff negligence and defendant negli-
gence are treated in the same equation, there is no reason to refer to
them by different names in front of the jury.
Moreover, the use of different terminology may mislead the jury.
The Act compares the causal negligence of the parties, irrespective of
whether they are plaintiffs or defendants. The unintended implication
from the word "contributory" is that there is a difference in quality
based upon status of a party, when in fact one does not exist. The
potential for confusion may be further compounded where causation
is presented to the jury in terms of the "substantial contributing fac-
tor" test. 17  Similar consideration dictates that the word "compara-
tive" be used quite cautiously and solely to explain the process of
fixing the percentages in Question 5. Even though one can "compare"
the causal negligence of plaintiff and defendant on a percentage basis,
one cannot logically speak in terms of the "comparative negligence" of
the plaintiff without leaving the same inaccurate impression as is gen-
erated by reference to the "contributory negligence" of the plaintiff.
16. See D.M. Bare Paper Co. v. Steward, 205 Pa. Super. Ct. 286, 290, 208 A.2d 890, 892
(1965).
17. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court prefers a jury instruction using the substantial con-
tributing factor formulation for the requirement of causation. Hamil v. Bashline, 481 Pa. 256, 392
A.2d 1280 (1978); Whitner v. Von Hintz, 437 Pa. 448, 263 A.2d 889 (1970). The supreme court,
however, still finds the older "proximate cause" terminology an acceptable alternative. Ford v.
Jeffries, 474 Pa. 588, 379 A.2d 111 (1977). Error can also probably be avoided if the least
descriptive phrase "a legal cause" is used, but the use of this standard may blur the crucial
distinction between "factual" and "legal" cause enunciated by the supreme court. See Flickinger
Estate v. Ritsky, 452 Pa. 69, 305 A.2d 40 (1973) (factual causation is a question of fact; proxi-
mate causation is a question of law). Consequently, these three alternatives are included in the
proposed interrogatories in descending order of desirability.
1978-1979]
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The instruction has been drafted so that it may be used regard-
less of the number of defendants against whom a case is submitted.
The portions of the instruction itself that are in parentheses are to be
used where the jury is charged on the liability of more than one
defendant. The interrogatories have been drafted on the assumption
that multiple defendants are present since it is easier to modify them
where only one defendant is involved than to adapt interrogatories
addressing single defendant cases to cases with several defendants.
The instruction itself and, to a lesser degree, the special inter-
rogatories, take the position that the plaintiff's negligence is com-
pared to the combined negligence of all the defendants for the pur-
pose of ascertaining whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover from
any defendant. There is no need for the instruction or interrogatories
to address whether the plaintiff can recover from a particular defen-
dant whose percentage of causal negligence is less than that of the
plaintiff, since as long as the plaintiff's causal negligence does not
exceed 50%, he can recover from any causally negligent defendant,
who will then have a right to proportionate contribution.
Both the instruction and interrogatories assume that only the
negligence of the parties is considered in the assignment of percen-
tages. They presume that values cannot be placed upon the causal
negligence of other actors who have not been joined, the so-called
phantom defendants. The language of the Act would seem to leave
little room for debate on these matters. Nevertheless, it should be
anticipated that counsel for defendants will frequently argue the con-
trary positions. With this in mind, the instruction and interrogatories
have been drafted so that a trial judge who disagrees with one of the
statutory interpretations presumed in the instruction need only make
minor modification in the model.
Section (a) of the Act provides that a plaintiff is not barred by his
negligence where it "was not greater than the causal negligence of
the defendant or defendants against whom recovery is sought," and
further provides for the diminution of damages "in proportion to the
amount of negligence attributed to the plaintiff." Given its plain
meaning, the word "defendant" would certainly exclude nonparties.
The seemingly redundant phrase "against whom recovery is sought"
was perhaps appended to make the exclusion of nonparties clearer. 18
18. If the phrase "against whom recovery is sought" were interpreted as evidence of an
intent to exclude additional defendants joined by an original defendant from the § (a) assess-
ment, the goal of completely apportioning responsibility in one action would be frustrated un-
[VOL. 24: p. 518
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Although it would have been possible to use more precise language,19
the logical import of stating the person against whom plaintiff negli-
gence is weighed in the singular and the plural is that the plaintiff's
conduct and right to recover are not to be measured against each of
the multiple defendants individually. There is no other logical expla-
nation for including the words "or defendants." If the General As-
sembly had intended to condition the plaintiff's right to recover upon
his negligence not exceeding that of any single defendant or even to
so condition his right to recover against a particular negligent defend-
ant, it surely would not have used the words "or defendants."
20
This conclusion is supported by the enunciation of the reduction
to be made on account of plaintiff negligence. The final clause of sec-
tion (a) calls for the subtraction from the plaintiff's recovery of an
amount of dollar damages proportional to his share of the total negli-
gence. The clause does not provide for the plaintiff to recover the
percentage of his damages caused by a particular defendant's or all of
the defendants' negligence, 21 as apportionment among the defendants
is a separate matter having no effect upon the plaintiff's rights.
This reduction based upon plaintiff negligence rather than recov-
ery in proportion to defendant negligence is necessary to preserve the
independence of the operation of section (b) from section (a). At the
same time, the establishment'in one proceeding of the factual conclu-
sions needed to apply each section of the Act is facilitated. It should
be noted that these two sections have been combined in the jury
instruction solely in the interest of economy. The first sentence of
section (b) establishes a comparative system to replace the division of
contribution under the prior law into equal shares. The second sen-
tence reiterates the rights of the plaintiff to collect the full amount of
a judgment from any liable defendant 2 2 and of a defendant paying
less it were made clear in § (b) that the negligence of additional defendants was to be consid-
ered in measuring defendants' rights inter se. See note 24 infra.
19. The phrase "the combined negligence of the defendants" might have clarified the pre-
cise meaning of the statute.
20. If the Act had addressed the parties solely in the singular, it would have been unclear
whether plaintiff's negligence was to be measured individually against the negligence of each
defendant. Such a construction would probably have been reasonable, but the Act could ratio-
nally have been considered silent on the issue. At the least, an ambiguity would still have
resulted.
21. The absence of a reference in this clause to a calculation of recovery based upon the
percentage of defendant negligence further negates the possibility of a legislative intention to
include phantom defendants in the determination of the plaintiff's right to recovery.
22. These rights of the plaintiff are not modified or conditioned upon the plaintiff's percent-
age negligence being less than that of the defendant against whom the plaintiff is going to
execute judgment.
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more than its share to receive contribution from other liable defend-
ants.
23
Section (b) contains language that is seemingly extraneous to that
found in section (a). In providing that the apportionment among joint
tortfeasors be based upon relative fault rather than equal shares, the
first sentence in section (b) speaks of the ratio of the percentage of
causal negligence attributed to one defendant to the percentage "at-
tributed to all defendants against whom recovery is allowed." The
language "against whom recovery is allowed" was apparently in-
tended, as was the case in section (a), to exclude the consideration of
the causal negligence of phantom defendants as well as to possibly
encourage the joinder of all potentially liable persons in one ac-
tion. 24 Similarly, the second sentence addresses the plaintiff's right
to collect the full judgment from one defendant in terms of "recovery
from any defendant against whom such plaintiff is not barred from
recovery." In combination with the language of the first sentence,
this language may have been used to regulate the rights of several
causally negligent defendants where one had settled with the plaintiff
and obtained a release. It is more likely that this language was in-
tended to clarify that the Act had no effect upon the law of im-
munities, such as interspousal immunity. 25 Nevertheless, at least
one commentator 26 has lost sight of the fact that both sections of the
23. Had the legislature neglected to clearly state the perpetuation of these rights, it would
have been arguable that the legislature intended a change requiring the plaintiff to execute
against each causally negligent defendant for proportionate shares of the judgment. The extra
time and expense required under that approach would have been exacted from even the most
innocent plaintiff, including one whose percentage of causal negligence was zero, with an atten-
dant risk that the plaintiff would not be compensated for the percentage of his damage assigned
to a judgment-proof tortfeasor.
24. The excess language in the first paragraph of § (b) may have been intended to negate
the inference created by the excess language in § (a). That language raised the inference that
additional defendants joined by an original defendant are not to be included in the apportion-
ment. See note 18 and accompanying text supra. The legislature may have intended to exclude
phantom defendants in both respects and also to exclude additional defendants in measuring
plaintiff negligence and the plaintiff's right to recover, on the ground that the plaintiff should
have joined them if he wanted to benefit from the assignment of a percentage of the total causal
negligence to them. Consistent with this interpretation, additional defendants would be in-
cluded in apportioning contribution, since an original defendant did in fact join them and
thereby signify a desire to have the percentage of their causal negligence considered in the
determination of his rights.
25. Under Pennsylvania law, one spouse cannot maintain a negligence action for personal
injuries against the other spouse. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 111 (Purdon 1965). In addition, one
spouse cannot enforce a judgment against the other as an additional defendant. Falco v. Pados,
444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971). An original defendant, however, is able to join a spouse as an
additional defendant. PA. R. Civ. P. 2252(a). Thereafter, the spouse can enforce a right to
contribution against the joined spouse. Puller v. Puller, 380 Pa. 219, 110 A.2d 175 (1955).
26. Timby, supra note 3, at 231. This commentator also recommended that phantom
defendants be included in the apportionment of causal negligence, notwithstanding reference in
§ (a) to "defendants against whom recovery is sought." Id. at 230.
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Act address entirely separate rights and, liabilities and has apparently
suggested that the phrases "against whom recovery is allowed" and
"against whom such plaintiff is not barred from recovery" in section
(b) negate the plain language of, and logical implications in, section
(a). This commentator would maintain that the plaintiff's negligence
be measured separately against each individual defendant's negli-
gence. 
27
Any doubts as to the meaning of the statutory language in cases
involving multiple defendants dissolve upon examination of the policy
behind the Act and the obvious intent of the legislation. The effects
of the various possible interpretations are best illustrated by way of
example. Let us hypothesize several jury responses to Question 5 of
the special interrogatories. 28 First, assume the following responses:
Percentage of causal negligence
attributable to Defendant A 30%
Percentage of causal negligence
attributable-to Defendant B 20%
Percentage of causal negligence
attributable to Defendant C 10%
Percentage of causal negligence
attributable to the plaintiff 40%
The second part of section (a) calls for plaintiff's damages to be re-
duced by 40% when the verdict is molded. The first part of that
section clearly denies the plaintiff any recovery when his conduct is
greater than 50% of the cause of the injury. One must then ask
whether it intends to further condition the plaintiff's right to recover
upon the number of tortfeasors whose actions combine to produce
injury. It is submitted that the law should not reward joint tortfeasors
or encourage the exercise of less care where one sees that another is
already not exercising due care, yet that is the effect of interpreting
the statute to measure the plaintiff's conduct against each defendant
individually. If the injury would have resulted without the negligence
of the Defendants B and C, whether the plaintiff can recover be-
comes completely fortuitous under this interpretation.
27. Id. at 231.
28. For the text of the special interrogatories, see text accompanying notes 8 & 9 supra.
1978-1979]
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Now let us reverse the percentages assigned to Defendant A and
the plaintiff:
Percentage of causal negligence
attributable to Defendant A 40%
Percentage of causal negligence
attributable to Defendant B 20%
Percentage of causal negligence
attributable to Defendant C 10%
Percentage of causal negligence
attributable to the plaintiff 30%
If the plaintiff cannot recover from Defendants B or C, he then must
collect all of the judgment, which is 70% of his damages, from a 40%
causally negligent defendant, Defendant A, who is without any right
to contribution from Defendants B and C.2 9  Imposing 70% of the
loss upon a 40% causally negligent defendant does not comport with
section (b)'s avowed policy of apportioning contribution upon the
basis of relative fault 30 and renders the drafting of the final sentence
of section (b) an exercise in absolute futility. Conversely, if effect is
given to the policy and intent of both sections, the plaintiff can re-
cover 70% of his damages from any of the three defendants and any
defendant paying the full judgment can receive proportionate con-
tribution from the others. Ultimately, assuming all have sufficient fi-
nancial resources, Defendant A would pay 40% of the damages, or
57% of the judgment, Defendant B 20% of the damages, or 29% of
the judgment, and Defendant C 10% of the damages, or 14% of the
judgment. If one of the causally negligent defendants is judgment-
proof, the others will have to absorb his share proportionately.
31
29. Defendants B and C would not be "defendants against whom recovery is allowed."
30. This result more closely resembles that which would be reached under the old common
law rule prohibiting contribution among joint tortfeasors. See Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher
Co., 292 Pa. 334, 141 A. 230 (1928). The common law rule was subsequently changed to permit
contribution in equal shares by the more equitable Uniform Contribution Among Tort-feasors
Act, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8324 (1978). See Brown v. Dickey, 397 Pa. 454, 155 A.2d 836 (1959)
(right to contribution is an equitable right based on common liabiity to plaintiff).
31. Any inequity in this result is a lesser of alternative evils. Someone has to suffer if one
joint tortfeasor is judgment-proof. Prior law, both before and after the Uniform Contribution
Among Tort-feasors Act, 42 PA. CON. STAT. § 8324 (1978), recognized that it was more equita-
ble to force the loss upon the other tortfeasors than the injured victim of the tort. This policy is
perpetuated under the Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act.
[VOL. 24: p. 518
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Finally, let us attribute the negligence of Defendants B and C to
a phantom defendant in each of the two examples above, or simply
make Defendants B and C nonparties. We then have a 40% causally
negligent plaintiff and a 30% causally negligent defendant in the first
example, with the percentages reversed in the second example. If the
nonparties or phantom defendants are considered in the assessment of
fault, the same inequitable results are reached as if in the two prior
examples it had been assumed that the plaintiff's negligence must be
measured against that of each defendant individually. If the nonpar-
ties are stricken from consideration, the percentages of plaintiff and
defendant negligence must be reevaluated for the total to equal
100%.
Two likely methods of reapportionment by the jury appear. One
is to view the plaintiff's percentage of causal negligence as a constant,
while the other is to maintain proportional consistency between the
plaintiff and the defendant in the case, with the percentage of causal
negligence of each increasing proportionately until a total of 100% is
reached. The latter is more consistent with the apparent spirit of the
Act, yet the former cannot be ruled out as the choice of a significant
percentage of juries. Under the circumstances of the hypothetical, the
method chosen is determinative of the plaintiff's right to recover in
the first example and alters the amount of judgment in the second.
Taking the plaintiff's share of negligence as a constant, the plaintiff
will be entitled to recover 60% of his damages in the first case and
70% in the second. If proportional consistency is maintained, the
plaintiff will be barred from recovery in the first case since he is 57%
causally negligent, but not in the second, where the plaintiff is 43%
causally negligent. Disposition of whether the plaintiff can recover
would be as it was apparently intended, since the plaintiff was more
negligent than the sole defendant in the first case and less negligent
in the second.
One should realize from the last hypothetical that it is unclear
whether plaintiffs or defendants benefit from their respective tactical
decisions on whom to sue and whom to join, especially in situations
where one person is not patently more negligent than all other per-
sons. 32 This is also in accordance with apparent legislative intent. It
is unlikely that the General Assembly intended to place either plain-
tiffs or defendants at an adversarial disadvantage not based upon the
32. Although the effect of a decision may not be as drastic where one person was obviously
primarily at fault, any such tactical decision can have a monetary effect. Furthermore, the
merits of the decision remain debatable at least until a verdict is rendered.
1978-1979]
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facts of an accident or occurrence. Although less than perfect, the
striking of phantoms unable to defend themselves at trial avoids the
automatic frustration of the policy and intent of the two sections of
the Act that occurs when phantom defendants are included in the
apportionment of responsibility, or when a plaintiff's right to recover
and a defendant's right to contribution are measured by the propor-
tionate causal negligence of each defendant individually.
VI. STRICT LIABILITY
Manufacturing lobbies have made extensive efforts in recent
years to eliminate strict liability and return tort law to the total de-
pendence upon negligence theory existing prior to the landmark
California decision in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.," and
the passage of section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts (Re-
statement) in 1965. 34 These authorities impose liability without a
showing of fault upon sellers of products. 35  Quite understandably,
one of the principal areas of attack has been upon the unavailability of
the opportunity to the defendant to defeat or reduce recovery by as-
serting the failure of a product user to exercise due care. Critics of
strict liability have begun to utilize the equitable notion of compara-
tive negligence as one of the weapons in this attack.
36
The application of comparative negligence principles to strict lia-
bility cases has one obvious effect: where contributory negligence was
formerly not a defense in a strict liability case, a manufacturer's finan-
cial responsibility for the quality of its products is reduced in direct
proportion to the average injured consumer's percentage of causal
33. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). In Greenman, the Supreme
Court of California held a manufacturer of a power tool strictly liable in tort to a consumer. Id.
at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Section 402A provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused
to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is enganged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in
the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual
relation with the seller.
id.
35. See notes 33 & 34 supra.
36. For a list of courts and commentators, see Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d
725, 740-41, 575 P.2d 1162, 1170-71, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 388-89 (1978).
[VOL. 24: p. 518
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negligence if comparative negligence is applied. Detractors of strict
liability also hope to obscure and possibly negate the social policy
underlying the development of strict liability, which posits that the
financial and evidentiary burden of senseless injury to the consump-
tion oriented public should be borne by the enterprise profiting from
the consumers because that enterprise is in the best position to bear
the risk of injury for product deficiency, to discover inadequacies, and
to increase the safety of a product. 37  The avowed policy of compara-
tive negligence to relieve the harsh result of denying compensation to
a plaintiff where he is partially responsible for his injuries and of ab-
solving the defendant of all the consequences of his negligent con-
duct, 38 is already fulfilled under strict liability in tort, which denies
any defense based upon merely negligent conduct of the plaintiff.
Any other equitable purpose for comparative negligence runs contrary
to the fundamental rationale underlying strict liability and can only
undermine that rationale if comparative principles are applied. 39 The
question therefore becomes which public policy is of paramount im-
portance in the context of product related injuries.
The threat to the existence of strict liability on a practical level
goes deeper than any conflict in public policy. Jurors are specifically
instructed that those placing products into the stream of distribution
may be subjected to liability in the absence of any negligence. 40  To
request jurors to ignore defendant conduct in assessing liability, and
then to ask them to consider it in assessing damages, may be too
much to demand. This is especially true since lawyers themselves
experience this trouble. It has been frequently suggested that
defendant conduct may be kept out of the apportionment of negli-
gence to the plaintiff by framing the comparison in terms of "causa-
tion" rather than "negligence" or "fault." 4 ' Nevertheless, the temp-
37. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 701 (1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment c (1965).
38. See note 4 and accompanying text supra. See also W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 433 (4th
ed. 1971).
39. It is therefore not incongruous to allow damages to be reduced or denied if the plaintiff
sues in negligence, but not if he includes an alternative strict liability claim based on the same
occurrence. Any inequity in allowing a negligent and thus more culpable defendant to assert the
victim's fault, while prohibiting a strictly liable defendant from doing so may be easily remedied
by a public policy prohibiting contributory negligence as a partial or total bar in a products
liability action based upon any theory of liability.
40. The Restatement rule applies even though "the seller has exercised all possible care in
the preparation and sale of his product." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(a)
(1965).
41. It is even more frequently suggested that the substitution of words such as "fault" or
"blameworthiness" for "negligence" in strict liability cases will solve conceptual difficulties. This
recommendation, however, only evinces the failure to comprehend that strict liability is liabil-
ity without fault.
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tation to jurors to view defendant conduct as relevant in situations
where it is not remains the same. Moreover, the practical difficulty in
comparing the causative conduct of the plaintiff based upon fault with
the causative effect of the product, for which a defendant is liable
without fault, cannot be dismissed lightly.
Perhaps the best judicial discussion of whether or not to apply
comparative negligence principles to strict tort liability actions is con-
tained in Daly v. General Motors Corp.42 In Daly, the Supreme
Court of California announced that comparative fault principles would
be extended to strict liability in tort cases because it was "fair to do
so." 43 In reaching this conclusion, the court examined many au-
thorities from other states, 44 and concluded that a majority of the
jurisdictions passing on the question had decided to extend compara-
tive negligence into strict liability. 45  An examination of this analysis
illustrates that there is a need for painstaking research before one is
persuaded by any apparent trend in the development of strict liability
defenses. Each state must actually decide the question individually in
light of its own precedents.
Of the courts in the seven states in which the Daly opinion
found that comparative negligence principles had been applied to
strict liability, 46 the Supreme Court of Texas and the United States
District Court for the District of Idaho did so only in connection with
a previously absolute defense of unforeseeable misuse of product. 47
Of the remaining five courts, only the Supreme Court of Alaska 48 had
42. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978). The majority opinion written
by Justice Richardson and the separate opinions written by Justices Clark, Jefferson, and Mosk
are recommended.
43. Id. at 742, 575 P.2d at 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 390. In Daly, the defendant, a car
manufacturer, contended that its responsibility for the plaintiff's injuries sustained in an acci-
dent should have been reduced due to the failure of the deceased, plaintiff's spouse, to lock the
car door and wear the seat belt. Id. at 731, 575 P.2d at 1165, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 383. The court
stated that the deceased would have suffered only minor injuries had he not been thrown from
the car. Id. at 730, 575 P.2d at 1164, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
44. Id. at 739-42, 575 P.2d at 1170-71, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 388-89.
45. Id.at 739, 575 P.2d at 1170, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
46. Id. at 739-40, 575 P.2d at 1170-71, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 388-89.
47. Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976)
(Idaho's "not as great as" comparative negligence statute specifically addresses only negligence
actions applied to unforeseeable misuse, but not ordinary contributory negligence); General
Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977) (the "pure" form of causal apportionment
adopted with regard to unforeseeable misuse was not to be confused with Texas' "not greater
than" comparative negligence statute).
48. Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alas. 1976) (judicial
adoption of "pure" form of comparative negligence covering all plaintiff conduct). In addition to
Alaska, the Ninth Circuit and California have judicially adopted a "pure" form of comparative
negligence covering all plaintiff conduct. See Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc., v. Marine Constr. &
Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1977); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575
P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
[VOL. 24: p. 518
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previously followed the Restatement's position in Comment n49 that
contributory negligence is no defense in a section 402A action. 50  The
Supreme Courts of Florida 5 1 and Wisconsin 52 had never before
considered strict liability defenses. Additionally, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, applying Mississippi law, 53 and
the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire 54
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n (1965). Comment n provides:
Contributory negligence. Since the liability with which this Section deals is not based
upon negligence of the seller, but is strict liability, the rule applied to strict liability
cases . . . applies. Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such
negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the product, or to guard
against the possibility of its existence. On the other hand the form of contributory negli-
gence which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known
danger, and commonly passes under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense under
this Section as in other cases of strict liability. If the user or consumer discovers the
defect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use
of the product and is injured by it, he is barred from recovery.
Id. The introduction by the Comment of an element of unreasonableness into this definition of
assumption of risk is curious. Elsewhere, the Restatement suggests that contributory negligence
is measured by an objective standard and assumption of risk by a subjective one. See id. § 496,
Comment d. Hereinafter, where a distinction is helpful, the Comment n form of assumption of
risk will be referred to as "objective" assumption of risk and the form not requiring an element
of unreasonableness as "subjective" assumption of risk.
50. Id. § 402A, Comment n. See Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319, 329 (Alas. 1970).
51. West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976) (judicial adoption of "pure"
form of comparative negligence covering all plaintiff conduct except the failure to discover a
defect or guard against the possibility of its existence).
52. City of Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 641, 207 N.W.2d 866
(1973) (comparative negligence statute applicable to contributory negligence and assumption of
risk tinder Wisconsin's "negligence per se" theory of strict liability).
53. Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1975) (Mississippi's "pure"
comparative negligence statute applies to contributory negligence but not to misuse of product).
54. Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676 (D.N.H. 1972) (applying New
Hampshire's "not greater than" comparative negligence statute specifically addressing only neg-
ligence actions). The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has made some in-
teresting interpretations of New Hampshire law in related areas. For example, the First Circuit
has applied the portion of the New Hampshire comparative negligence statute, N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN § 507:7-a (Supp. 1977), relating to plaintiff negligence to the strict liability claim of
an injured user. Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1150 (1st Cir. 1974). The Cyr court,
however, refused to apply the part relating to apportionment among tortfeasors, N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (Supp. 1977), on the ground that defendant negligence was irrelevant
under strict liability. 501 F.2d at 1155. The First Circuit later held that there was no error in
the failure to charge on strict liability where defendant had been found negligent, strongly
implying that the injured consumers were better off with negligence theory in the comparative
negligence era. Rodrigues v. Ripley Indus., Inc., 507 F.2d 782 (1st Cir. 1974). But cf. Green-
land v. Ford Motor Co., 155 N.H. 564, 347 A.2d 159 (1975) (rejecting Rodrigues as a basis for
error in the failure to charge on negligence where defendant was found not strictly liable).
In addition, the Supreme Court of Minnesota has held that state's "not as great as" com-
parative negligence statute, Act of May 23, 1969, ch. 624, § 1, 1969 Minn. Laws 1069 (amended
1978), which specifically addressed only negligence actions, applicable under strict liability to all
plaintiff conduct except the failure to discover a defect or guard against the possibility of its
existence, even though by statute contributory negligence was a total bar to strict liability and
the burden of proof was arguably upon the plaintiff. Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., - Minn.
-, 262 N.W. 2d 377 (1977). This comparative negligence statute was subsequently amended
to apply specifically to strict liability. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West Supp. 1979) (generally
effective April 15, 1978).
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were faced with decisions of the highest state court holding all forms
of unforeseeable contributory negligence and all forms of contributory
negligence, respectively, complete defenses to strict liability
claims. 55 On the other hand, the basic Restatement position on con-
tributory negligence was followed by the Court of Appeals of Col-
orado, 56 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
applying Nebraska law,57 and the Supreme Court of Oklahoma5 8
which had rejected the judicial extension of comparative negligence
into the strict liability area. 59
Comment n had never even been considered in Arkansas,
Maine, and Rhode Island, three of the five states in which the Daly
opinion found comparative negligence statutes that were not limited
in their language to negligence actions. 6°  In the other two states,
Mississippi and New York, the highest state courts had held that all
forms of contributory negligence were complete defenses to strict lia-
bility. 61 In Connecticut, where there was a specific statutory prohibi-
tion against the use of comparative principles in strict liability
actions, all forms of contributory negligence, except the failure to
55. Ford Motor Co. v. Matthews, 291 So. 2d 169 (Miss. 1974); Stephan v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 110 N.H. 248, 266 A.2d 855 (1970).
56. Kinard v. Coats Co., 37 Colo. App. 555, 557, 553 P.2d 835, 837 (1976) (cert. denied)
(§ 402A rests not upon negligence principles but on the concept of enterprise liability).
57. Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795, 802 (8th Cir. 1976) (statute is inappropriate
where proof of negligence or degree of fault is not required). Subsequent to the decision in
Melia, the Nebraska comparative negligence statute, NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1964)
(amended 1978), was modified to encompass strict liability. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, Legis. Bill No.
665, § 6, 1978 Neb. Laws 565 (to be codified as NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151).
58. Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1367 (Okla. 1974) (statute is specifi-
cally limited to negligence actions).
59. The strict liability defenses in Colorado and Oklahoma actually approached the Pennsyl-
vania defenses to strict liability more closely than the Comment n position. For the text of
Comment n, see note 49 supra. For a discussion of the Pennsylvania defenses, see notes 64-97
and accompanying text infra. In Colorado, assumption of risk focused more on a subjective
standard than on an objective one. See Culp v. Rexnord & Booth-Rouse Equip. Co., 38 Colo.
App. 1, 2-3, 553 P.2d 844, 845 (1976) (cert. denied). The only other defense in that state
was causative misuse, which is unanticipated misuse that reaches the extent to which the user's
conduct, not the defect, caused the accident. See Kinard v. Coats Co., 37 Colo. App. 555, 553
P.2d 835 (1976) (cert. denied). This defense has also been defined as the sole proximate cause of
the accident. Bradford v. Bendix-Westinghouse Automotive Air Brake Co., 33 Colo. App. 99,
113, 517 P.2d 406, 413 (1973). In Oklahoma subjective assumption of risk and misuse were
available defenses. Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1366 (Okla. 1974). The
defense of misuse was later clarified to require that not reasonably foreseeable misuse be the
sole proximate cause. Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 555 P.2d 48, 57 (Okla. 1976).
60. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 739, 575 P.2d 1162, 1170, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380, 388 (1978).
61. Ford Motor Co. v. Matthews, 291 So. 2d 169, 175 (Miss. 1974) (if user's negligence was
reasonably foreseeable); Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 343-45, 298 N.E.2d 622, 629-30, 345
N.Y.S.2d 461, 470-72 (1973) (rejecting comparative negligence on ground that adoption was a
legislative function and adopting contributory negligence as a bar to recovery under strict liabil-
ity).
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discover a defect or to guard against the possibility of its existence,
had judicially 62 and statutorily been made complete defenses.
63
Let us turn now to the relevant precedents in Pennsylvania and
then to the language of the Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act
itself. Prior to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Berke-
bile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp.,64 there was a great deAl of confusion
with respect to whether the Pennsylvania strict liability defense of
assumption of risk included the objective element found in the Re-
statement's Comment n. 65 Although the supreme court continues to
refer favorably to Comment n, 6 6 it now appears reasonably clear that
the test of assumption of risk is purely subjective. 67 The Berkebile
court held that a plaintiff could be precluded from recovery in a strict
liability case "only if he knows of the specific defect eventually causing
his injury and voluntarily proceeds to use the product with knowledge
of the danger caused by the defect." 6 8 Rejecting the conten-
tion that a plaintiff could be barred from recovery by his own negli-
gence, 69 the court emphasized that "a finding of assumption of risk
must be based on the individual's own subjective knowledge, not
upon the objective knowledge of a 'reasonable man.' -70
Defined in this purely subjective form, assumption of risk was
the only recognized defense to strict liability. Nonliability through an
affirmative defense of misuse or abnormal use of product was pre-
cluded by the Berkebile court, which stated that "evidence which
would be admissible in a negligence case to prove 'abnormal use' is
admissible in a strict liability case only for the purpose of rebutting
62. Hoelter v. Mohawk Serv., Inc., 170 Conn. 495, 365 A.2d 1064 (1976).
63. Act of June 7, 1977, Pub. Act No. 77-335, 1977 Conn. Legis. Serv. 504 (West) (effective
as to all actions pending on or brought after June 7, 1977). Connecticut had enacted a compara-
tive negligence statute expressly applicable to negligence actions. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 52-572h (West Supp. 1978).
64. 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975).
65. See, e.g., Bartkewich v. Billinger, 432 Pa. 351, 247 A.2d 603 (1968) (court indicated that
actions were obviously dangerous); Ferraro v. Ford Motor Co., 423 Pa.324, 223 A.2d 746 (1966)
(apparent injection of the objective element of proceeding unreasonably into the defense). For
the text and a discussion of Comment n, see note 49 supra. For a discussion of the distinction
between "subjective" and "objective" assumption of risk, see id.
66. See, e.g., McCown v. International Harvester Co., 463 Pa. 13, 342 A.2d 381 (1975);
Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975).
67. A subjective standard does not doom industrial employees, who by acquiring experience
on the job usually become aware of the dangers involved in using machinery, since their en-
counters generally cannot be truly "voluntary." See Houston v. Tri-State Mach., 2 Pa. D. &
C.3d 796 (C.P. Allegheny County 1977) (en bane).
68. Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 100, 337 A.2d 893, 901 (1975) (cita-
tions omitted).
69. Id.
70. Id. (citations omitted).
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the plaintiff's contentions of defect and proximate cause. It is not
properly submitted to the jury as a separate defense." 71
The Berkebile court also rejected any attempt to inject into strict
liability such negligence concepts as the "unreasonably dangerous"
requirement of section 402A, 72 any form of the "reasonable man"
standard, and foreseeability. 73 The court held that
the "reasonable man" standard in any form has no place in a strict
liability case. The salutary purpose of the "unreasonably danger-
ous" qualification is to preclude the seller's liability where it cannot
be said that the product is defective; this purpose can be met by
requiring proof of a defect .... The plaintiff must still prove that
there was a defect in the product and that the defect caused his
injury; but if he sustains this burden, he will have proved that as
to him the product was unreasonably dangerous.
74
On the issue of proximate cause, the Berkebile court stated that
[t]o require foreseeability is to require the manufacturer to use due
care in preparing his product. In strict liability, the manufacturer is
liable even if he has exercised all due care .... Foreseeability is
not a test of proximate cause; it is a test of negligence ...
Because the seller is liable in strict liability regardless of any
negligence, whether he could have foreseen a particular injury is
irrelevant in a strict liability case. In either negligence or strict
liability, once the negligence or defective product is shown, the
actor is responsible for all the unforeseen consequences thereof no
matter how reriiote, which follow in a natural sequence of events.
75
71. Id. at 99, 337 A.2d at 901.
72. For the text of § 402A, see note 34 supra. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently
reaffirmed this position in Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 557-58, 391 A.2d 1020,
1026 (1978).
73. Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 96-97, 337 A.2d 893, 900 (1975).
74. ld.
75. 1d. at 97, 337 A.2d at 900 (citations omitted). The decision in Berkebile was based upon
Pennsylvania precedents and social policy. See id. at 93-95, 337 A.2d at 898-99. The court
reasoned:
The law of products liability developed in response to changing societal concerns over
the relationship between the consumer and the seller of a product. The increasing com-
plexity of the manufacturing and distributional process placed upon the injured plaintiff a
nearly impossible burden of proving negligence where, for policy reasons, it was felt that
a seller should be responsible for injuries caused by defects in his products. . . . We
[have] therefore held . . . that the seller of a product would be responsible for injury
caused by his defective product even if he had exercised all possible care in its design,
manufacture and distribution. We emphasized the principle of liability without fault most
recently by stating that the seller is "effectively the guaranter [sic] of his product's
safety . .
The crucial difference between strick [sic] liability and negligence is that the exis-
tence of due care, whether on the part of seller or consumer, is irrelevant. The seller is
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Relying upon the principles in Berkebile and an earlier decision
in Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co.,76 the supreme court unani-
mously approved the following jury instruction given in Azzarello v.
Black Brothers Co.:77
The (supplier) of a product is the guarantor of its safety. The
product must, therefore, be provided with every element neces-
sary to make it safe for (its intended) use, and without any condi-
tion that makes it unsafe for'(its intended) use. If you find that the
product, at the time it left the defendant's control, lacked any ele-
ment necessary to make it safe for (its intended) use or contained
any condition that made it unsafe for (its intended) use, then the
product was defective, and the defendant is liable for all harm
caused by such defect.
78
This instruction, intended as a definition of "defect," was drawn from
the work of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court Committee for Pro-
posed Standard Jury Instructions, Civil Instruction Subcommittee,
79
which in turn was drawn from Berkebile and Salvador, and was re-
ferred to in Azzarello as "one which expresses clearly and concisely
the concept of 'defect,' while avoiding interjection of the 'reasonable
man' negligence terminology."80
Writing for the unanimous Azzarello court, Justice Nix held that
any jury instruction using the term "unreasonably dangerous" to
responsible for injury caused by his defective product even if he "has exercised all possi-
ble care in the preparation and sale of his product." .. . [T]he seller "may not preclude
an injured plaintiff's recovery by forcing him to prove negligence in the manufacturing
process." What the seller is not permitted to do directly, we will not allow him to do
indirectly by injecting negligence concepts into strict liability theory.
Id. (citations omitted) (footnote omitted), quoting Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 457 Pa.
24, 32, 319 A.2d 903, 907 (1974); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A)(2)(a) (1965).
76. 457 Pa. 24, 319 A.2d 903 (1974). In Salvador, the court explained that
a manufacturer by virtue of section 402A is effectively the guarantor of his products'
safety .... Our courts have determined that a manufacturer by marketing and advertising
his product impliedly represents that it is safe for its intended use. We have decided that
no current societal interest is served by permitting the manufacturer to place a defective
article in the stream of commerce and then to avoid responsibility for damages caused by
that defect.
Id. at 32, 319 A.2d at 907 (citations omitted).
77. 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978).
78. Id. at 559 n.12, 391 A.2d at 1027 n.12, quoting PENNSYLVANIA STANDARD JURY IN-
STRUCTION 8.02 (Civil) (Subcomm. Draft, June 6, 1976). In Azzarello, the court, dealing with a
design defect, did "not consider when the risk of loss is placed upon the supplier in cases where
an unavoidably unsafe product is involved or where there is an averment of inadequate or
absence of warnings." 480 Pa. at 559 n.l, 391 A.2d at 1026 n.il.
79. See PENNSYLVANIA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTION 8.02 (Civil) (Subcomm. Draft, June 6,
1976). The Subcommittee followed prior state law by not drawing a distinction among the types
of defect alleged. See id. The rationale and logic of Azzarelo would therefore readily extend to
all types of defects.
80. 480 Pa. at 559 n.12, 391 A.2d at 1027 n.12.
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gauge whether the manufacturer of an industrial coating machine
would be subject to strict liability for the absence of infeed guards or
safety devices on the machine was reversible error, as it was "in-
adequate" 8  and "misleading." 82 The "unreasonably dangerous"
formulation of the Restatement had been "primarily designed to pro-
vide guidance for the bench and bar, and not to illuminate the issues
for laymen;" that is, for use in considering questions of law where
"resolution depends upon social policy." 83 These words had "no
independent significance and merely represent[ed] a label to be used
where it is determined that the risk of loss should be placed upon the
supplier" and were condemned by the court for improperly suggest-
ing "considerations which are usually identified with the law of neg-
ligence." 84
It should be noted that in diversity cases applying Pennsylvania
law, the federal courts have failed to give any effect to Berkebile. 8
Although the decision to affirm the superior court's reversal of the
verdict for the defendant 8" in Berkebile was unanimous, only two
justices signed the opinion.8 7 Since the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
does not have to give precedential value to one of its own opinions
signed by less than a majority of the court, 88 the federal courts89
have apparently concluded that they have the authority to assign
no precedential value to such an opinion. 90 Even though the
Berkebile opinion was signed by only two justices, prior to Azzarello,
the supreme court had not negated Berkebile's effectiveness as the
81. Id. at 558, 391 A.2d at 1026.
82. Id. at 560, 391 A.2d at 1027.
83. Id. at 557-58, 391 A.2d at 1026.
84. Id. at 555, 391 A.2d at 1025.
85. See, e.g., Bair v. American Motors Corp., 535 F.2d 249 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam);
Bowman v. General Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. 234 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Schell v. AMF, Inc., 422
F. Supp. 1123 (M.D. Pa. 1976), vacated and remanded, 567 F.2d 1259 (3d Cir. 1977); Beron v.
Kramer-Trenton Co., 402 F. Supp. 1268 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd, 538 F.2d 318 (3d Cir. 1976).
86. 462 Pa. at 104, 337 A.2d at 903.
87. In Berkebile, three justices merely concurred in the result. Two other justices wrote
separate concurring opinions.
88. E.g., Bata v. Central-Penn Nat'l Bank, 448 Pa. 355, 293 A.2d 343 (1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1108 (1973); Commonwealth v. Silverman, 442 Pa. 211, 275 A.2d 308 (1971); Com-
monwealth v. Little, 432 Pa. 256, 248 A.2d 32 (1968).
89. The trial court judges have shown no hesitancy in rejecting Berkebile. See cases cited
note 85 supra. Appellate panels, on the other hand, have avoided discussion of the issue. But
see Greiner v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengeselleschaft, 540 F.2d 85, 94-95 (3d Cir. 1976). Re-
cently, a panel studiously omitted the phrase "unreasonably dangerous" and any reference to
Berkebile, although it did rely upon dictum in a plurality opinion signed by only two justices in
Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 457 Pa. 321, 319 A.2d 914 (1974), in discussing
foreseeability. Schell v. AMF, Inc., 567 F.2d 1259, 1263 (3d Cir. 1977).
90. See Beron v. Kramer-Trenton Co., 402 F. Supp. 1268, 1276-77 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd,
538 F.2d 318 (3d Cir. 1976).
[VOL. 24: p. 518
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expression of state strict liability law. Berkebile had in fact been
utilized, along with Salvador,9' to support the rejection of contribu-
tory negligence and comparative negligence as defenses in strict lia-
bility cases in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in McCown
v. International Harvester Co.92
In affirming a judgment for the plaintiff, a truck driver whose
misjudgment caused an initial collision and brought a steering wheel
defect into question, 93 the McCown court unanimously continued to
resist injection of a "reasonable man" standard into the realm of strict
liability. 94 Chief Justice Jones' opinion, which was signed by four
other justices, 95 rejected contributory negligence as an available de-
fense. 96 The McCown court also rejected the application of compara-
tive negligence to strict liability, stating that "[t]o initially apply a
theory of comparative negligence to an area of the law in which liabil-
ity is not premised upon negligence seems particularly inappro-
priate." 
97
Against this analysis of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's deci-
sions in the area of strict liability, it is necessary to examine the lan-
guage contained in the Comparative Negligence Act. Section (a) of
the Act begins with the language: "In all actions brought to recover
damages for negligence resulting in death or injury to person or
property .... ." It then proceeds to state: "[T]he fact that the plaintiff
may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a re-
covery by the plaintiff or his legal representative where such negli-
91. For a discussion of Salvador, see note 76 supra.
92. 463 Pa. 13, 342 A.2d 381 (1975). The Third Circuit, relying on McCown as part of its
guidance to the court below upon retrial of a case involving a single vehicle accident and a
manufacturing defect, has concluded that, even in a bifurcated trial where liability and damages
are tried separately, admitting evidence of the consequences of the decedent's failure to wear
his seat belt on the issue of damages would introduce comparative negligence standards into the
assessment of damages and violate the policy of strict liability. Vizzini v. Ford Motor Co., 569
F.2d 754, 766-67 (3d Cir. 1977). The dissenting judge in Vizzini favored admission of such
evidence solely for the assessment of damages, with the burden of proof placed upon the
defendant. Id. at 771 (Weis, J., dissenting).
93. 463 Pa. at 15, 342 A.2d at 381-82.
94. Id. at 15-16 & 16 n.3, 342 A.2d at 382 & n.3.
95. Justice Roberts, the author of the sole opinion in Salvador, did not participate in the
McCown decision. In a concurring opinion in McCown, Justice Pomeroy offered an additional
explanation of the court's rationale, consistent with both the majority opinions and the princi-
ples of Berkebile. See id. at 17-20, 342 A.2d at 383-84 (Pomeroy, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 16 n.2, 342 A.2d at 382 n.2 (citation omitted). Rejecting contributory negligence
as an available defense, the McCown majority noted: "Recently, we did suggest our rejection of
contributory negligence as a defense to 402A liability in . . . [Berkebilel per .Mr. Chief Justice
Jones with Mr. Justice Eagen, Mr. Justice O'Brien and Mr. Justice Manderino concurring in
the result and Mr. Justice Roberts and Mr. Justice Pomeroy filing separate concurring opin-
ions." Id. (citation omitted).
97. Id. at 16 n.3, 342 A.2d at 382 n.3.
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gence was not greater than the causal negligence of the defendant or
defendants against whom recovery is sought .... . Section (b) of the
Act addresses apportionment of damages among defendants "in the
ratio of the amount of his causal negligence to the amount of causal
negligence attributed to all defendants against whom recovery is al-
lowed." The plain language of the Act, in particular the emphasized
language, 98 leaves little room for debate. Plaintiff negligence is com-
pared with defendant negligence. If there is no defense based upon
plaintiff negligence and defendant negligence is not an element of a
prima facie case under a cause of action, it would appear that the Act
could have no application to that cause of action. As we have seen,
contributory negligence is not a defense to strict tort liability in
Pennsylvania,99 and Pennsylvania strict liability is not based upon
negligence. 100 For the Act to apply to strict liability actions, con-
tributory negligence would have to be interpreted as meaning as-
sumption of risk, and negligence as meaning strict liability. In the
absence of any legislative intent'01 that such a strained interpretation
be given to the plain language of the statute, the sole support for
construing the Act as applicable to strict liability is that courts in
other jurisdictions have so construed their own comparative negli-
gence statutes. 102 This must be tempered by the realization that no
other statute is exactly identical to Pennsylvania's, and that prior
strict liability law in those states was also different.
10 3
One must assume that the draftsmen of the Pennsylvania Act
were aware of the Pennsylvania common law and its policies, and
further that the legislators voting on the Act at least had general
notice. As an aid to statutory interpretation, this assumption may in-
deed be the strongest reasoning that the Pennsylvania courts will
utilize. Another possible assumption is that the legislature knew how
to draft a comparative responsibility statute specifically encompassing
strict liability. 104
98. Emphasis in the portions of the Act quoted in the text has been added by the authors.
99. See notes 95-97 and accompanying text supra.
100. See notes 64-75 and accompanying text supra.
101. The only published legislative discussion concerns debate over an amendment to the Act
which would have allowed the plaintiff to recover only if his negligence was less than the
defendant's negligence. 1 PA. LEG. J. 1703-07 (Senate 1976).
102. See notes 42-63 and accompanying text supra.
103. See id.
104. This assumption is supported by the fact that a bill providing for comparative responsi-
bility in strict liability in tort actions was passed by the Pennsylvania Senate in 1978. Pa. S. Bill
585, 161st Gen. Assembly, 1977 Sess., § 11. Section 11 of the bill, as amended on third consid-
eration, June 26, 1978, and passed and sent to the House on June 27, 1978, provides:
[VOL. 24: p. 518
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It is submitted that if the Pennsylvania General Assembly had
intended the Comparative Negligence Act to apply to strict tort liabil-
ity actions, or to any other action not premised upon negligence, it
would have been a simple matter to so provide. At least one other
legislature which initially enacted a comparative negligence statute
applicable on its face only to negligence actions has recognized the
difference between "to recover damages for negligence resulting in
death or injury to person or property" 105 and "to recover damages for
death or injury to persons or property." 106 In Oregon, the words
"negligence resulting in" were eliminated when the legislature
Comparative responsibility in product liability actions.
(a) In any product liability action in which recovery is sought on the basis of strict
liability in tort or breach of warranty, the responsibility of the person suffering the harm,
as well as the responsibility of all others for causing the harm, shall be compared by the
trier of fact. The responsibility of the person suffering the harm shall not bar recovery for
the harm sustained where it was not greater than the responsibility of the party against
whom recovery is sought. However, any damages allowed shall be diminished in propor-
tion to the amount of responsibility attributable to the person recovering.
(b) The court may, and when requested by either party shall, direct the jury to find
separate special verdicts determining the amount of damages and percentages of responsi-
bility attributable to each party; and the court shall then reduce the amount of such
damages in proportion to the amount of responsibility attributable to the person recover-
ing.
(c) Where the recovery is allowed against more than one defendant, each defendant
shall be liable for that proportion of the total dollar amount awarded as damages in the
ratio of his responsibility to the amount or responsibility attributed to all defendants
against whom recovery is allowed.
(d) As used in this section, "responsibility" means conduct which was a substantial
factor in bring[ing] [sic] about the harm for which damages are sought.
Id. § 11.
Enactment of the bill would, of course, render the general question of the Comparative
Negligence Act's applicability to products liability actions moot, although enactment would raise
other questions.
105. Act of June 30, 1971, ch. 668, 1971 Or. Laws 1516 (amended 1975). That statute pro-
vided:
Contributory negligence, including assumption of the risk, shall not bar recovery in an
action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence result-
ing in death or injury to person or property if such negligence contributing to the injury
was not as great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any
damages allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of such negligence
attributable to the person recovering.
Id. (emphasis added). The Pennsylvania Act uses similar language.
106. OR. REV. STAT. § 18.470 (1977). This section provides:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his legal
representative to recover damages for death or injury to person or property if the fault
attributable to the person seeking recovery was not greater than the combined fault of the
person or persons against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be
diminished in the proportion to the percentage offault attributable to the person recover-
ing. This section is not intended to create or abolish any defense.
Id. (emphasis added). The Oregon legislature further provided that the "doctrine of implied
assumption of risk is abolished." Id. § 18.475(2).
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amended its comparative negligence statute in 1975.107 Reference to
a defendant's conduct as amounting to "negligence" was abandoned in
favor of reference to "fault." 108
VII. PRODUCT LIABILITY JURY INTERROGATORIES
The Oregon experience is interesting if only for the apparent ef-
forts of an Oregon trial judge to draft a special verdict form that
would eliminate the need for a retrial if the appellate court disagreed
with his decision to avoid charging on the applicability of comparative
principles to a strict liability count, while specifically charging on
their applicability to a negligence count.' 0 9 The desirability of such a
form in Pennsylvania should be evident. It can be anticipated that
defendants in most strict liability cases arising after the effective date
of the Comparative Negligence Act will raise the question of applica-
tion of the Act to strict liability actions, and it may be years before
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decides the issue. In the meantime,
a premium should be placed upon the practicality of instructions and
special interrogatories that will withstand any appellate resolution,
with the most drastic possible result being that the appellate court
will remold the jury verdict into a judgment. The following form is
offered as appropriate for use where causes of action in both strict
liability and ordinary negligence are submitted to a jury:
107. See id. § 18.470. For the text of the amended section, see note 106 supra. No reported
case has been found which applied Oregon's comparative negligence statute to a strict liability
action accruing prior to the 1975 amendment. The Oregon Supreme Court had in fact re-
peatedly espoused the position of Comment n to § 402A on contributory negligence and as-
sumption of risk. E.g., Johnson v. Clark Equip. Co., 274 Or. 403, 547 P.2d 132 (1976); Findlay
v. Copeland Lumber Co., 265 Or. 300, 509 P.2d 28 (1973). Subsequent to the amendment, the
Ninth Circuit held that the first version did not apply to strict liability, but stated in dictum that
the 1975 version did so apply. Brown v. Link Belt Corp., 565 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1977). The
Oregon court has held that an added section, Oss. REV. STAT. § 18.475(2) (1977), abolished the
assumption of risk defense in subsequently accruing strict liability cases, presumably implying
that the comparative negligence amendment applied to these cases, since otherwise neither
contributory negligence nor assumption of risk would defeat or reduce recovery. See Hornbeck
v. Western States Fire Apparatus, Inc., 280 Or. 647, 572 P.2d 620 (1977).
The 1975 amendment of § 18.470 also removed any ambiguity with respect to the effect of
the statute in cases involving multiple defendants.
108. It should be noted that the Oregon doctrine of strict liability, at least in defective design
cases, is based upon fault. See Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033
(1974); Roach v. Kononen, 269 Or. 457, 525 P.2d 125 (1974).
109. The form is set out in Hornbeck v. Western States Fire Apparatus, Inc., 280 Or. 647,
-n.2, 572 P.2d 620, 623 n.2 (1977). In Hornbeck, the effort was of no avail when the jury
returned a verdict for the defendant, because the judge had charged on the abolished deffnse of
assumption of risk and had not given the jury separate interrogatories concerning the issues
under the strict liability count. Id. at _ , 572 P.2d at 621-23.
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COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE WHERE STRICT LIABILITY
AND
NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION ARE SUBMITTED TO
THE
JURY-SPECIAL VERDICT FORM
I. Upon Plaintiff's cause of action in strict liability the jury will
answer the following questions:




2. Was there a defect in the product?
(a) Yes
(b) No
3. Was a defect in the product a (substantial contributing fac-
tor as defined in the charge) (legal cause) (proximate cause) in
bringing about the harm suffered by the plaintiff?
(a) Yes
(b) No
4. Did the plaintiff assume the risk of injury (as that defense
was defined in the charge)?
(a) Yes
(b) No
II. Upon Plaintiff's cause of action in negligence the jury will an-
swer the following questions:
1. Was the defendant negligent?
(a) Yes
(b) No
2. Was the defendant's negligence a (substantial contributing
factor as defined in the charge) (legal cause) (proximate cause)
in bringing about the harm suffered by the plaintiff?
(a) Yes
(b) No
If your answer to Question 11-1 or 11-2 is "no" and your
answer to I-1, 1-2, or 1-3 above is "no," this completes
your deliberations and your foreperson should sign these
special findings and you should return to the court room.
Do not answer any remaining questions. If your answer to
Questions I-1 and 11-2 is "yes," proceed to answer Ques-
tion III.
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If your answer is "no" proceed to Question V below.
2. Only if you answered 111-1 above "yes," answer this ques-
tion: was the plaintiff's negligence a (substantial contribut-
ing factor as defined in the charge) (legal cause) (proximate
cause) in bringing about his harm?
(a) Yes
(b) No
If your answer is "no" proceed to Question V below.
IV. If you answered 111-1 and 111-2 "yes," what percentage of




If you find the negligence of defendant contributed less
than 50% to cause the injury and your answer to I-1,
1-2, or 1-3 is "no," this completes your deliberations and
your foreperson should sign these special findings, omit-
ting Question V, and return to the court room.
If you find the negligence of defendant contributed 50%
or more to cause the injury or your answer to I-1, 1-2,
and 1-3 is "yes," proceed to answer Question V.
V. Regardless of your answers to Questions I, II, III or IV,
what are plaintiff's total money damages?
These interrogatories may be modified to accommodate various
factual situations. For example, if a disputed factual issue which can-
not be decided as a matter of law is not presented under one of these
questions, 1 10 then the question concerning that issue should be omit-
ted and the remaining questions renumbered accordingly. Question V
may have to be supplemented if a spouse is a named party, i.e., if
there is a claim for loss of consortium, for a separate award to that
spouse must be made."' In Questions 1-3, 11-2, and 111-2, it is also
suggested that a trial judge select the phrase which best blends in
with the charge.
112
110. For example, a defendant might not challenge whether it either manufactured or sold
the product involved. In such a case, assumption of risk cannot be submitted to the jury unless
evidence has been introduced by the defendant to show the plaintiff's subjective knowledge or
awareness of the specific defect and that an injury could flow therefrom.
111. See Hopkins v. Blanco, 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 116, 302 A.2d 855 (1973), aff'd, 457 Pa. 90,
320 A.2d 139 (1974).
112. The phrase "a legal cause" is least desirable since it may cause confusion between "fac-
tual" and "legal" cause and blur the distinction between the two enunciated in Flickinger Estate
v. Ritsky, 452 Pa. 69, 305 A.2d 40 (1973). Although "a substantial contributing factor" is prefer-
able to "a proximate cause" since it is more descriptive and more likely to be understood by the
jurors, either phrase is acceptable. Ford v. Jeffries, 474 Pa. 588, 379 A.2d 111 (1977). The
[VOL. 24: p. 518
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This special verdict form presupposes that assumption of risk is a
defense to strict liability, that the Act applies only to negligence
counts, and that oral instructions will be given in accordance with this
view. It is submitted, however, that as long as a jury resolves the
primary liability issues of causation and defect/negligence in favor of
the same party under both strict liability and negligence theories, a
verdict can be molded to relfect any position as to the effect of the
Comparative Negligence Act without requiring a retrial on any issue.
For example, suppose the jury finds that the defendant is strictly li-
able and negligent and, further, that the plaintiff is 30% causally neg-
ligent. The Act mandates a 30% reduction in plaintiff's total money
damages under the negligence count unless, for public policy reasons,
comparative negligence is held not to apply to any cause of action for
product related injuries. If comparative principles do not apply to
strict liability, damages under the strict liability count are unaffected,
and the additional finding on plaintiff's causal negligence becomes ex-
traneous. If they do apply, it is a simple matter to reduce the strict
liability damages also by 30%.113 As long as the total damages are
known, any appropriate reduction can be made in molding the ver-
dict.
Moreover, a jury's answer to the question on assumption of risk,
although it may affect the amount of the verdict as molded, cannot
negate the utility of the form. Suppose the jury finds as above and
additionally answers affirmatively to the assumption of risk ques-
tion. 114 If the plaintiff assumed the risk of the defect which the jury
found to exist under strict liability theory, he necessarily assumed the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, treats the former as the true meaning of causation.
Whitner v. Von Hintz, 437 Pa. 448, 263 A.2d 889 (1970). See note 17 supra.
Early experience with forms using both the phrases "substantial contributing factor" and
"what percentage of negligence did plaintiff and defendant contribute to cause the injury" indi-
cates that jurors may confuse the two concepts involved by wondering whether a substantial
factor must causally contribute 50% or more to the harm. For this reason it is recommended
that if the phrase "substantial contributing factor" is used, it should be qualified with "as de-
fined in the charge."
113, Strictly speaking, § (a) of the statute requires the reduction "in proportion to the amount
of negligence attributed to the plaintiff," even though it otherwise addresses the comparison of
plaintiff negligence with defendant negligence. Since the causal percentage of plaintiff negli-
gence cannot be measured in a vacuum and plaintiff negligence must be compared with some-
thing in the assessment of causal percentage, it does beg the question to phrase the issue of the
percentage reduction this way. If any reduction would have to be made under a strict liability
count, it appears more likely that a court would make the same reduction as under the negli-
gence count, rather than a presumably greater reduction. This reflects the difference between
conduct labeled negligent and the distribution of a defective product, that is, the difference
between the defendant being negligent and merely strictly liable in cases where the plaintiff
was negligent.
114. A negative answer would obviously leave the result in the above hypothetical unchanged
under any interpretation of the law.
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risk- of this same defect under negligence theory. 115  If assumption of
risk remains a complete defense under either theory, judgment is
entered for the defendant on that particular count. If it has impliedly
been abolished or merged into the conduct calling for the application
of comparative principles under either theory, the verdict may be
molded accordingly, unless the reviewing court views the conceptual
difference between contributory negligence and assumption of risk
such that, under the particular facts of the case, the latter was not
included in the jury's assessment of the former. 116
Regardless of the status of the Comparative Negligence Act with
respect to strict tort liability, retrial on any issue can probably be
avoided through the use of the special verdict form if primary liability
issues are resolved in favor of the same party under both theories of
liability. The most serious drawback to use of the form may arise if a
jury finds the defendant strictly liable but not negligent. 117  In this
circumstance, an ambiguity occurs as to whether the jury should ans-
wer Question III and IV. The form intentionally neither provides nor
implies an answer to this question. Directions applying to all other
possible combinations of answers to Questions 1-1, 1-2, 1-3, 1I-1, and
11-2 are provided immediately following Question 11-2 and preceding
Question 111-1. If a jury answers Question III, it will then at least
consider Question IV if it follows the directions, answering Question
IV if it answers "yes" to Questions III-1 and 111-2.
The answer to Question IV, even assuming that the causal negli-
gence of plaintiff was responsible for a certain percentage of his dam-
ages, is subject to doubt. Suppose, as earlier, that this percentage is
30%. The problem is that Question IV asks what percentage of negli-
gence plaintiff and defendant contributed to cause the injury. Even
though the total must equal 100%, it would be entirely consistent
with the spirit of the finding that defendant is strictly liable but not
negligent for the jury to respond "Plaintiff 30%" and "Defendant
0%." If the jury's thought processes are in fact so strongly evidenced,
it is questionable whether the failure to reach a total of 100% would
115. A problem may arise where different defects are alleged under the two theories of liabil-
ity.
116. Although -the conceptual difference of one defense involving what is objectively reason-
able and the other involving a particular person's state of mind is easy to state, years of case law
have demonstrated that it is most difficult to apply. See PENNSYLVANIA STANDARD JURY
INSTRUCTION, Subcomm. Note 3.04 (Civil) (Subcomm. Draft, September 26, 1976).
117. The converse, a jury finding in plaintiff's favor on negligence and against him on strict
liability, presents no such drawback. In that instance, the jury would be required by the form
to address the comparative negligence issues and there would be no necessity for a reviewing
court to consider application of the statute to a strict liability claim.
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withstand post-trial attack. An even more literal approach would be
for the jury to respond "Plaintiff 100%" and "Defendant 0%." Since
the defendant was not negligent, all of the negligence was that of the
plaintiff, even though he was only 30% responsible for the damages.
On its face, this answer must be interpreted as meaning that plaintiff
was completely responsible. One must ask whether the additional
finding of strict liability renders the verdict inconsistent, or whether
that finding is overriden by the subsequent one. From the plaintiff's
standpoint, the best possible appellate resolution is the ordering of a
retrial limited to apportionment, since no one could divine from the
verdict as a whole that the plaintiff's share of responsibility was 30%.
The most likely jury response to Question IV may be "Plaintiff
30%" and "Defendant 70%." Having initially filled in the first blank
with the proper figure, the jury would then follow the portion of the
charge requiring that the total equal 100%.118 Moreover, common
sense would favor marking down "Defendant 70%." On its face, this
response is undeniably inconsistent with the finding that defendant
was not negligent, and a retrial on both issues would appear almost
inevitable.
The likelihood of either a retrial no matter what numbers the
jury indicates to reflect the plaintiff's 30% responsibility or the entry
of a judgment that does not reflect its actual findings appears so great
that one might be tempted to alter the wording of Question IV where
it asks for the percentage causal negligence of defendant. Any change,
however, would run afoul of the conclusions drawn earlier that at-
tempts at synonyms or pseudonyms for negligence, such as "fault,"
"blameworthiness," and "responsibility," beg the question of the
applicability of the Act to strict liability and also violate the funda-
mental policy of section 402A. 119
Notwithstanding the concern for Question IV, it is questionable
whether a jury finding a defendant strictly liable and not negligent
will answer Question III. If the Comparative Negligence Act does not
apply to strict liability, it does not matter whether these questions are
answered. If the Act does apply, the answers must be provided at
some point. It appears that half of the time the questions will be
118. To omit from the charge that the total must equal 100% creates a more serious problem
than it solves. Omission encourages the attribution of percentages to innumerable unstated
causes-even bad luck or coincidence-and unnamed parties, the so-called phantom defend-
ants. It is submitted that the language of the Act plainly forbids attribution of percentages to
parties other than those at the trial. For a discussion of this problem, see notes 18-32 and
accompanying text supra.
119. See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
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answered and retrial is avoided. With respect to the other half of the
time, a retrial limited to comparative negligence issues will at least be
mandated if the Act applies to strict liability.
The ambiguity can, of course, be easily removed, but not with-
out posing a greater danger to the basic premise of the form. For
example, the phrase "or your answer to Questions 1-1, 1-2, and 1-3 is
'yes' " could be added to the sentence preceding Question III so that
the sentence becomes "[i]f your answer to questions 11-1 and 11-2 is
'yes' or your answer to Questions 1-1, 1-2, and 1-3 is 'yes,' proceed
to answer question III." Or alternatively, the phrase "11-1 and 11-2
'yes' and" could be added to the beginning of Question IV so that it
becomes "if you answered 11-1 and 11-2 'yes' and III-1 and 111-2
'yes,' what percentage of negligence did plaintiff and defendant con-
tribute to cause the injury?" The clear import of the former to the
jury would be that comparative principles apply to the strict liability
cause of action, although the countervailing consideration posited by
Question IV's calling for the percentage of negligence attributable to
the defendant would still remain. If a reviewing court held the Act
inapplicable to strict liability, it could ignore any answers to Ques-
tions III and IV, but the form would presume that the opposite was
the more likely appellate conclusion. The latter addition would not
entirely cure the ambiguity since it would create the implication that
Question IV was not to be answered if the jury found the defendant
not causally negligent. The implication, however, would at least fol-
low an initial encounter with Question III without any guidance as to
whether Question III should be answered. This addition might make
it more likely that Questions III and IV would be answered following
a negative response in Question II, but it could further impair the
effort at an air of neutrality crucial to the utility of the form. This
would also increase the chance of retrial being required if the Act was
considered applicable to strict liability actions. If the primary goal is a
special verdict form with the greatest possibility of avoiding relitiga-
tion, it is suggested that the ambiguity must be accepted.
In cases submitted to a jury under only one of the two theories
of strict liability and negligence, a standard special verdict form can-
not be devised which preserves the air of neutrality. The inter-
rogatories must suggest either applicability or nonapplicability of the
Comparative Negligence Act to the particular cause of action. It does
remain possible that the appellate courts might remold any verdict for
a plaintiff less than 50% causally negligent if interrogatories concern-
ing comparative negligence are submitted to the jury and it is sub-
sequently held that the Act does not apply. The trial judge, however,
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cannot avoid specifically addressing the issue of applicability. The
form for cases submitted under both theories may be adapted with
only cosmetic changes, such as renumbering of questions and removal
of references to questions not submitted, to fit the trial judge's view.
For example, if the trial judge decides that the Act applies to pro-
ducts liability cases under negligence theory but not strict liability, he
can submit Questions I and V in strict liability cases and Questions
II, III, IV, and V in negligence cases.
VIII. MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS IN STRICT
LIABILITY/NEGLIGENCE CASES
In multiple defendant cases in which at least two defendants
have been sued under a strict liability theory and under a negligence
theory, 120 a set of special interrogatories addressed to each cause of
action involving the plaintiff and the defendants should be submitted
to preserve the integrity of a plaintiff's strict liability cause or causes
of action. 121 This procedure increases the risk of inconsistent jury
findings, since consistency may require that the jury put down the
same numerical percentage in answer to separate questions. It does,
however, avoid the necessity of a new trial in order to apply section
(b) of the Act under the following circumstances: 1) one defendant is
found strictly liable but not negligent and another defendant is found
both strictly liable and negligent; and 2) the Pennsylvania appellate
courts adopt the position that the contribution of a strictly liable,
nonnegligent manufacturer to the plaintiff's judgment be equitably
apportioned to the contribution of a negligent and strictly liable
supplier who is below the manufacturer in the chain of distribution
on a comparative fault basis, rather than on an equitable share
basis. 122
120. In the majority of cases, it is probably a tactical mistake for a plaintiff to sue more than
one defendant under both theories.
121. A defendant sued only in strict liability will usually attempt to destroy this integrity by
joining an additional defendant under negligence theory. In a recent Pennsylvania case, an
original defendant successfully employed this tactic at the trial court level. See Azzarello v.
Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 550, 391 A.2d 1020, 1022 (1978). For a discussion ofAzzareflo, see notes
77-84 and accompanying text supra.
122. See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 579 P.2d 441, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550
(1978). The California court reached this conclusion on the basis of "fairness and other tort
policies." Id. at 330, 579 P.2d at 445, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 554. The court's decision was influenced
by the following: 1) in the precomparative negligence era, negligent and strictly liable
tortfeasors could be ultimately responsible for a judgment upon a 50-50 basis; 2) a middleman
was, unlike the consumer-victim, a tortfeasor; and 3) in the postcomparative negligence era, a
contrary holding would leave a negligent manufacturer in a better position to shift responsibility
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The factual setting necessary for a problem to arise with the ap-
plication of section (b) is not uncommon. Suppose, for example, that
an injured consumer of a product brings strict liability and negligence
actions against both the seller and the manufacturer of the prod-
uct, and the defendants seek contribution and/or indemnity from
each other. 123  Suppose further that the jury finds the manufacturer
strictly liable but not negligent and the seller both strictly liable and
negligent. If the basic premise that section (a) of the Comparative
Negligence Act does not apply to a consumer's strict liability action is
accepted, the plaintiff is entitled under the principles of Berkebile
and Azzarello 124 to keep that action free of considerations of negli-
gence law. Furthermore, the defendants are entitled to have any ap-
propriate apportionment made.
The major difficulty in presenting interrogatories to the jury is in
maintaining neutrality on the question of the application of section (a)
to the seller's strict liability claim against the manufacturer, and yet
directing that application of section (b) be made to the manufacturer's
negligence claim against the seller. Although this difficulty is analo-
gous to that necessitating the use of the special verdict form recom-
mended where the plaintiff brings strict liability and negligence ac-
tions against the same defendant, 125 it cannot be solved by adding
multiple defendants to that form in the manner employed in the in-
terrogatories within the recommended General Comparative Negli-
gence Jury Instruction. 126 In these cases, the intentional ambiguity
in the juxtaposition of the directions for filling in the strict liability/
negligence form cannot be perpetuated. Instead, the strict liability/
to another tortfeasor than a merely strictly liable manufacturer. Id. at 329, 579 P.2d at 444-45,
146 Cal. Rptr. at 553-54.
Prior to Safeway, the "'pure" form of comparative negligence, which does not condition the
right to recover upon a party's causal negligence being "not greater than" or "not as great as"
another party's, has been judicially adopted for original actions based upon negligence. See Li v.
Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1266, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975). This doctrine was
extended to actions based upon strict liability. See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d
725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978). A pure form of "comparative indemnity" bet-
ween negligent tortfeasors has also been recognized. See American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior
Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 574 P.2d 763, 143 Cal. Rptr. 692 (1978). The Safeway rationale loses
impact to the extent that the law of another jurisdiction does not recognize the comparative
principles of the prior California law.
123. One could also suppose that the plaintiff's action is brought under strict liability alone
and that the seller then sought contribution and/or indemnity from the manufacturer under
strict liability theory, who in turn sought contribution and/or indemnity from the seller.
124. For a discussion of Berkebile and Azzarello, see notes 64-84 and accompanying text
supra.
125. For the text of the recommended form, see text accompanying notes 109 &110 supra.
126. For the text of the recommended general form, see text accompanying notes 8 & 9
supra.
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negligence form must be submitted separately for each set of parties
whose rights and liabilities involve both negligence and strict liability
theory. In the example above, separate sets of interrogatories are re-
quired for the plaintiff against the seller, the plaintiff against the
manufacturer, and the seller, filling the position occupied by the
plaintiff in the first two sets, against the manufacturer.
127
When the jury returns its special findings that the manufacturer
was strictly liable and not negligent and that the seller was both
strictly liable and negligent, if it has also answered Question IV in the
set of interrogatories addressed to the seller's claim against the man-
ufacturer, the trial court will be able to mold a verdict according to
its view of the law. An appellate court will later be able to remold the
verdict without the retrial of any issue. If section (a) of the Act does
not apply to negligent consumers versus strictly liable sellers and
manufacturers, one would expect that section (b) also does not apply
to negligent sellers versus strictly liable manufacturers. Accordingly,
the negligent seller would be entitled to total indemnification from
the strictly liable manufacturer, as where the liability of both was
based solely on strict liability. 128 Like section (a), section (b) speaks
only in terms of negligence. Much of the policy behind strict liability
applies to and protects middlemen as well as consumers. The final
seller, the last cog in the stream of commercial distribution of the
product, is arguably in as poor a position as a consumer to discover a
defect, guard against the possibility of its existence, correct it, or dic-
tate how the product is made. Under these circumstances, the only
factors militating against giving the seller any rights against the man-
ufacturer are that it was in the business of profiting upon sales of the
product and was in a better position than the consumer to bear the
risk of loss. One must nevertheless recognize the possibility that a
different resolution may be reached by the appellate courts and
further that the position of the seller is not as secure as that of the
127. Had the consumer's action been brought against the two defendants only under strict
liability, with the seller seeking contribution and/or indemnity from the manufacturer under a
strict liability theory and the manufacturer seeking contribution and/or indemnity from the
seller under a negligence theory, the air of neutrality could not be preserved as to the applicability
of either § (a) or § (b) to strict liability. The trial judge would then have to decide whether to
submit Questions I and V or Questions II, III, IV, and V in each of the three sets.
A plaintiff may have greater difficulty convincing the trial judge to submit the extra sets of
interrogatories required to preserve neutrality if he has created the problem by suing both
defendants under both theories of liability. A seller may face similar difficulties if it has sought
to shift financial responsibility to the manufacturer under both theories instead of only under
strict liability.
128. E.g., Burbage v. Boiler Eng'r & Supply Co., 433 Pa. 319, 249 A.2d 563 (1969); Mixter
v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 313, 308 A.2d 139 (1973).
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consumer. Consequently, the likelihood of an apportionment between
seller and manufacturer being required is greater than the likelihood
of requiring an apportionment between consumer and supplier. To be
safe, the special interrogatories should be submitted in the sets
suggested above.
IX. CONCLUSION
Several questions concerning the application of the Pennsylvania
Comparative Negligence Act have been identified in this article.
These questions involve cases in which there are multiple defendants
or in which there is strict tort liability claim. This article has focused
upon the drafting of jury instructions which avoid the risk of revers-
ible error and provide as much flexibility as possible while still provid-
ing for a jury's resolution of relevant factual issues. Debate over the
proper solutions to the many questions of law which will arise under
the Act will surely continue until the Pennsylvania appellate courts
have resolved them. In the meantime, trial judges and the trial bar
must deal with them as pragmatically as possible. The suggested jury
instructions and special interrogatories have been suggested to this
end.
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